

Additional Instructions to Comrade A. I. Mikoyan on the Cuban Issue

November 22, 1962

P68/U

To comrades Khrushchev, Gromyko

Extract from protocol # 68 of Session of the Presidium of CC CPSU from November 22, 1962.

About additional instructions to comrade A. I. Mikoyan on the Cuban issue

To approve draft instructions to comrade Mikoyan on the Cuban issue (attached).

Secretary CC

To paragraph 5 of Protocol # 68

Secret

Top Priority

Havana

Soviet Ambassador—for Comrade A. I. Mikoyan

To your [telegrams] # 1893, 1892, 1885.

In accordance with the instructions, I report the following on the issues raised by you:

1. We sent you information about Kuznetsov's and Zorin's negotiations with McCoy and Stevenson, in which it was pointed out that the U.S. representatives were planning to give us the draft of the American declaration in the next several days. We will prepare and send our draft of the declaration (which we already have) for preliminary coordination with the Cuban friends, taking into account the U.S. document. In addition, we have to keep in mind that the Americans,

having stated that the form of the protocol does not suit their needs, have not made any statements regarding the substance of the protocol so far.

2. We were worried about the information that the directive from the Cuban Foreign Ministry to their representative in New York Lechuga contained the following phrase: “We have tactical nuclear weapons, which we should keep.”

Your considerations regarding the response to the Cuban friends on this issue were seen as correct.

In your conversations, start from the assertion that these weapons belong to us, and are to be kept in our hands only, we never transferred them to anyone, and we do not intend to transfer them to anyone. In addition, as we have told the Americans, all nuclear weapons had been removed from Cuba.

It would be advisable for the Cuban friends to correct urgently the directive given to Lechuga in that part, and to tell him clearly that there are no nuclear weapons in the Cuban hands. It is important to give such a directive to Lechuga immediately, so that he would not be able to make some statement in a careless conversation, which could be eavesdropped on, referring to that mistaken directive. All this is very important, because otherwise it could seriously complicate the affairs, if the Americans got the information, which does not correspond to reality as a result of the directive, which was given by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Lechuga.

3. As far as the new military agreement is concerned, we should start from the assumption that the issue of such an agreement will be discussed after you return to Moscow and that it would be inexpedient to discuss it now in Havana.

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Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.